The March Of History

Pakistan finds itself in the grip of multiple crises. How will it fare? Expert opinion is divided. Some believe the situation will worsen, some think it will stay the same, and some think it will improve. As Kipling might have said, they are all correct.

One does not have to adhere to Toynbee’s theory of history to benefit from a restatement of the past. In the 1950s, Pakistan’s economic growth was stilted, with GDP growing at three per cent a year and per capita GDP at 0.5 per cent a year. The dirty peace with India which followed the first war in Kashmir in the late 1940s forced Pakistan into a Cold War alliance with the US.

Domestically, the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah’s lieutenant, muddied the political scene. His successors came and went in rapid succession. The chain of failures was broken when martial law was imposed by Gen Ayub.

In the 1960s, GDP grew at 6.8 per cent a year and per capita GDP growth at 3.8 per cent. Pakistan was held up as a role model for the developing world and advisors from Harvard opined that the economy was about to take off. Unfortunately, income inequalities and regional disparities exacerbated during the period. Coupled with the letdown in expectations that followed the 1965 war in Kashmir, they led to massive political unrest that unseated the military regime.In the 1970s, GDP grew at 5.2 per cent a year and per capita GDP at 2.1 per cent. The decade had begun with the traumatic secession of East Pakistan in 1971. It saw the unanimous passage of a parliamentary constitution. The democratic transition was halted by a coup and seriously disturbed when the deposed prime minister was hanged.

In the 1980s, GDP grew at 6.5 per cent a year and per capita GDP at 3.2 per cent. The military ruled with an iron hand, emboldened by the largesse of the US which was directed at fomenting a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, GDP growth slumped to 4.1 per cent and per capita GDP growth to 1.1 per cent. This ‘lost decade’ was marked by political intrigue and halting growth reminiscent of the 1950s.

It had begun on great hopes since civilian rule had been reinstituted. However, the rivalry between the two major political parties was exploited by the military. The democratic process was not allowed to take root. The structural weaknesses of the economy were exposed, notably the heavy reliance on foreign savings. Defence spending and debt servicing accounted for 75 per cent of the federal budget, crowding out investments in social and human development.

This decade also saw Pakistan respond to India’s nuclear tests with its own. The US sanctions imposed on both countries crimped Pakistan much more than India. Even then, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore in 1999 augured well. However, the momentum for peace was shattered by another war in Kashmir. The decade concluded with a coup led by the man who had initiated that war.

The first decade of the 21st century had begun on great hopes, even though the military was again in power. Year-on-year GDP growth ramped up, from two per cent in the first year, to 3.1 per cent, 4.7 per cent, 7.5 per cent and nine per cent. However, it faltered in the sixth year, and dropped to 6.6 per cent. A slight upsurge to seven per cent in the seventh year was followed by a steep decline to 4.1 per cent in the eighth and two per cent in the ninth. Excluding the last year for which data is not yet available, this averages to four per cent.

The domestic political situation was troubled. The military ruler was preoccupied with legitimising his coup, initially through a referendum, then through parliamentary elections and finally through the courts. The tempo of terror went up, killing a major political leader as the nation geared up for general elections. Loadshedding became rampant. To stem the rot, the dictator imposed an emergency but it boomeranged and swept him out of office.

The civilian rule that followed was marred with a significant intensification of terror attacks and accompanied with political upheaval related to the restoration of the senior judiciary. Could the mayhem of the past decade — indeed of much of history — been avoided? Some have argued that Pakistan’s travails were caused by the early death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. Unquestionably, those deaths landed the country into a rough patch.

But Ayub’s first five years showed that the downward slide was not inexorable. So why did the positive achievements of that period not become the norm? Like many a dictator in history, Ayub succumbed to the fallacy of his indispensability. He rigged the elections of 1964, instigated the 1965 war over Kashmir and ignored the demands of the majority which resided in East Pakistan.

Even then, the situation would not have become dire had Ayub not handed over power to the army chief but to the speaker of the assembly, allowing the political evolution to continue. Gen Yahya proved to be a very bad choice. His political ambitions were exceeded only by his ineptness as supreme commander. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who followed him, was a populist in the tradition of Argentina’s Peron. During the election campaign, with his populist rhetoric he had raised the common man’s expectations to a high pitch. He failed to deliver on those exaggerated promises and the disenchanted groups turned on him.

Fearing electoral defeat, he rigged the 1977 elections. The ensuing chaos brought about his dismissal at the hands of the military. Gen Zia who followed him reinterpreted Pakistan as an Islamic state. Empowered by that vision, he created an army of jihadis to make war on the Soviets. Unfortunately, the jihadis did not disband once the Soviets pulled out. Instead, they turned on the Pakistani state.

Succeeding rulers were unable to rein them in, mostly because all of them subscribed to the notion that the jihadi army would be needed during the next war with India. Today, the jihadi threat looms large over Pakistan, dwarfing the threat from India’s nuclear bombs. In his new book, To Live or to Perish Forever, Nicholas Schmidle argues cogently that Pakistan could turn into a ‘jihadistan’ if it continues to be led by corrupt and inept leaders.

Can the march of history be reversed? Two conditions have to be met. The intellectuals have to provide new thinking on governance. And the leaders have to develop a new skill — listening.